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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
TIH~

STATE OF UTAH
Plain tiff-Respondent,

Case No.
11287

vs.
llERHERrr1 LEE SHONDEL,
Def end a nt-Apve ll ant

BRIEF OF APPELLANrr1

S'l1 A rr1El\rENT OF NA rrrRE OF CASE
,\p1wllant, lll>rlwrt Let> Shond('l, a1>peals from a
l'i;1<Lng of guilty of vossPssion of LSD and the sentence
jrnpo:wd tlH'reon in Third District Court, Salt Lake
Coimt_\·, Stat(~ of Utah.

DISPOSITION"

I~

LUWER COURT

( )n F<'hrnary 2G, 19G8, def1::'ndant, Herbert Lee Shonllc•l, follo\Ying a d<'nial of his motion to quash admitted
11i:~ possl'ssion of LSD as charged in the information,
:ind t1H' com·t fonnd him guilty of the offense charged;
\111n('t:p011, th(' conrt s<'nt<'ncPd Mr. Shondel to the Utah
;i.1i1· l'ri~,011 for the frlon_\· offrm:p allPged against him.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a dismissal of his conviction of pm:session of LSD and a setting aside of the sentencr imposed. Alternatively, defendant seeks to have the smtrnce reduced to a misdemeanor as provided in Utah\;
Drng Abuse Law.
STATEMENT OF FACrrS
Defendant, H<>rbert Lee ShondPl, was chargrd h,\·
way of information with pos:wssion of a narcotic drng·,
to-·wit: Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) in violation
of ~58-13a-2 U tali Code Ann. ( 1953) : such act ·was all<·g<'d
to ]iavc> occnrPd on or about OctohPr G, mm. (ri1-1'.2)
Lysergic acid or LSD was i11corpartcd into U tal1 's
narcotic law by the 1967 Legislature under ~58-13a-1 ( 15)
and d0fined as a narcotic drug hy paragraph (lG) of
the same section. lTnder ~58-13a-2 Utah Codl' Ann.
(1953), possession of LSD thus lwcame a felon:T off<•JlS('
·within the narcotic la\YS of Utah. ~5S-Ula-"14 lTtah Cnlk
Ann. (as enacted 1957). Ilm\'<'Y<T, in th<' ~;am<> session
of tlw 19G7 Lrgislatnn•, LSD \\'n.s declared to he a "dPpressant or stimnlant clrng [·~5~-33-1 (d) (:3), UtPll
Code Ann. (as 0nacted rnm)l, and po;.;s<·~:~~ion ol' L~·~D
was deelared 1111 law fol [ ~;s~~-:J:J-'.2 ( e) 1 ·t;._h Cod<> , \ mL
(as enacted 10(i7)] ancl a rni;.;d<·nw<11·.or ll\ ~s:~-:l:1-4(a) ol
th<> same ad.
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Due to the seeming inconsistencv between the two
ads, n-•lating to the control of LSD, counsel for the defrndant made a motion to qnash or alternative motion
to r<'<l11c<' the charge to a misdemeanor and argued the

:c;:mw lwfon~ the Honorahle l\Iarcellns K. Snow, Judge,
Third District Court, Rtate of Utah on February 26,
1968. Following a denial of connsrl's motion (T-37) the
collrt infonm•d Mr. Shondd lw was pleading to tlw
i'<•lony offrnse of possession of a naroctic drug. (T-37)
For th<' pnrpose of rm•fwning his right of appeal, Mr.
:-;Jiornl<•l admitt<'d to lwing in possPssion of LSD and tlw
r·n11rt found defendant guilt)- of the rrinw as chargc•d in
tl1r> i11forrnation. (rC-40) AftPr waiYing time for sentencing· <ld<>ndant was rommittefl to th<' Utal; State Prison
for tlw offensP invohTed. ('T'-18, '1'-40).

_;\]thong·li ('Olll1~wl also rais<•d tl1e <pwstion of cl<•-

1' lHbnt 's rip;lit to a speed:·< trial, '.;1wh i~-·s11P is nmY lwli<·wd to hP '.Yitlwnt rnurit, and only the ~:tatntor)T cpwstion n•lating to LSD is raised here. See Jloorc v. Turner
-t;'.2 P.2d 187 (Okla. Crim. 1967).
ARGUMENT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH IN THAT THE
LAWS OF UT AH RELATING TO POSSESSION OF
LSD ARE UNCONSITUTIONAL AS A DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTION DUE TO THE EXISTENCE
OF SEPAK:\TG STATUTES WHICH PROSCRIBE
IDENTICAL CONDUCT YET PROYIDE FOR SEPARATE PUNI~nil1.IENTS.
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Under Utah law possession of Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) constitutes a violation of §58-13a-2
Utah Code Ann. (1953), and a felony by the terms of
§58-13a-44 Utah Code Ann. (as enacted 1957). Lysergic
Acid or LSD vrns declared a narcotic drug in 1967 by
the Utah State Legislature by amendment. §58-13a-l
(1G). However, in 1967 the Utah Legislatnre also enacted
the Drug Abuse Control Law, being Section 58, Chapter
33. By the terms of §58-33-l(d) (3) LSD is declared a
"depressant or stimulant drug" and under §58-33-2 (c)
and §58-33-6 ( c), it is made unlawful for a person tc
possess any depressant or stimulant drug; such possession for a first offender constitutes a misdem<'anor und('r
§58-33--1-. To allow 10gislation to exist wherein one
, be punished by different

degre(~S

11iaY

for the sanw act is a

denial of equal protection and therefore unconstitutional.
Olsen v. DPlmore, 295 P.2d 324 (\:Vash. 1956); State r.

Pirkry, 281 P.2d 698 (Ore. 1955).
A side by side examination of the possession lmrs
of Utah relating to LSD under the Uniform Narcotic
Act (Section 58 Chapter 13a) and the Drug Abuse Lmr
will evidence• that with respect

~o

Lf!D

~Ctah

has bro

statutes covering the same snhject matter, yet eaeh providing for a diffrrent penalty.
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UNIFORM NARCOTIC

DRUG ABUSE

DRUG ACT

CONTROL LAW

~58-13a-1 (16) (as amended
19G7) "Narcotic drugs" means
... LSD-25, and every substance neither chemically nor
physically distinguishable
from them.

§58 - 33 - l(d) (as enacted
1967) The term "depressant
or stimulant drug" means:
( 3) Any drug or derivative
containing any quantity of
d-Lysergic acid diethylamide
commonly known as L.S.D.

s58-13a-2. It shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess ... any narcotic drug,
except as authorized in this

act.

§58-33-2. The following
acts and the causing thereof
are hereby prohibited: ( c)
The possession . . . of drugs
in violation of section 58-336 ( c) . . .

§G8-13a-44 (as enacted
l~l37) . . . Any person violating any other provision [including- 58-13a-2] of this chapter, shall, upon conviction be
punished for the first offense
by a fine of not less than
$1,000 or by imprisonment in
the Utah State Prison for not
~xceeding five years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment ... (Item in brackets is
by petitioner).

§58-33-4(a) Any person
who violates any of the provisions of section 58-33-2 shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor
and shall on conviction thereof
be subject to imprisonment
for not more than one year
or a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars or both such
imprisonment and fine ...

§58-33-6(c) No person,
other than a person described in subsection (a) or subsection (b) (2) shall posses
any depressant or stimulant
drug ...

rrlie above comparison shows definitely that Utah
hns two separate statutes proscribing the identical sub]«'d rnattt'l', to-·wit: vossc•ssion of LRD; yet each statute

<1111l1oriz<>s a separatt' and distinrt punishment.
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In State v. Pirkey, supra, defendant was charged
with writing insufficient fnnds checks contrary to Oregon
Law. The statute in question made knowingly issuing
an insufficient funds check a crime; howe,-er, either a
grand jury or a magistrate had the discretion to proceed against the accused by way of a misdemeanor or a
felony. The Supreme Court of Or0gon in affirming a
dismissal by th0 lower court held the statute unconstitutional as violative of equal protection guaranteed through
the Fourteenth Amendment. rrhe basis of the decision
·was that the statutes prescribed difforent degn•es of
punishment for the same act without specif~-ing any
recognizable standard to determine which punishment
shonld he im-okNl.
Pirkry has heen limited hy Rose 1:. Gladd

11,

,~0.)

P.2d 453 (Ore. 1965) to the sitnation wlwre sPparafr
offenses were provided in the same statute without any
reasonable basis for distinguishing the situation to whieh
either offense would be applicable. Such limitation,
however, does not affect defendant's position in tlrnt
it is believed that as between the provisions of 5S-3:l
and 58-13a, the crime of possession of LSD is precisely
the same in each instance and the punishments an~ diff(-'l'ent. Furth0r, since this court is not hound by Pirkl'.lf
supra, it is, likewise not bound h>- the limitation plae<·d
upon Pirkry h>- Gladden, supra.

Defrndant proce<'dvd h>- wa>- of 1nit of lla1was eor]Hl~
rn Olsrn ·v. Dr!morr, su1;rn, all<'g·:n.'--': his r<•:traint in tlw
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\rash ington penitentiary was illegal in that his convic1ion nnder a statute prohibiting the unlawful possession
of a firearm was unconstitutional. The basis of the alleL·ation was that the statute prescrilwd two degrees of
pllnislmwnt for the same offrnsP, to-wit: $500 fine or
one year in the county jail, or both, or one to ten years
in the stat0 penitentiary. Finding the statute unconstitutional under the FonrtPPnth AmendmPnt as 1\rpll as ~Wash
mgton's own equal protection clause> (Art. 1 ~12 \Vash.
Const.), the court held:
... that a statute which purports to autl10riz<'
prmwcnting officials to charge violations of a sc>ction of the penal code eitlwr as a gross misdrrneanor or a felon:-r constitutes a d( nial of equal
protrction under thr law. See State v. Boggs, 358
P.~?(l 124 at 128 (\Vash. 19G1) (aserihing such
l1n!(1ing to ()[sen, s11;1ru.).
1

D<·l"emlant in the instant casP is not unaware of thr
faet tliat thP two casrs cited ahoYe arP distinguishahlP
frnrn his own in that Pirkey and OlsPn both involYed a
single statute prescribing different punishments, wherPas
in tlw instant case two separate statutes are involv0d.
Howp1rer, the fact that two separate statutes prescribe
differen punishments would not he a reasonable basis to
distinguish the above cases, whPn the same problem of
rrprnl protection exists, i.e., granting to a prosecutor, at
his wltim, the right to proceed against a defendant by
fl lllisd< nwanor or a folonv for thr same act. Olsrn ii.
.
f7f
f},/uwre, supra; Cf. State 1'. Cnrmr111. 140 P.G70 (Utah
l !}l ! )
1

(
f

8
In State v. Cannan, s11pra, the Supreme Court of
Utah declared that an enactment of a misdemeanor law
prohibiting sale of liquor to Indians, impliedly repealPd
a statute making the same act a felony, in that the mi~. demeanor law was the most recent expression of the legi8lature. Hmvever, the basis for this decision was the sanw
as in Olsen and Pirkey s11pra; that is, the Utah Supreme
Court found it to be contrary to Legislative intent and
sound policy;

/

\

. . . that two laws upon the same snhjert
should be enforced, under whieh a vPndor eould
he sent to the state prison for a frlon)·, while
nnder the other he conld he eonvict(•<l of a mi~
demeanor rnerPly, and wlwther he ·was to n'cei\'r>
the greater or lesser punishment h(' made de1wnrlant npon the whim of a prosrcuting officer. Stu!
v. Carmon, s11pra, at 671.

One case which may appear in opposition to dt>fendant's position is that of State v. Reid, 401 P.2d 9SS
(Wash. 1965). Reid involved two separate statutes, each
of ·which involved possession of narcotics, hut prescrilwd
separate punishments, to-wit: a misdemeanor and a
felony. Although the Supreme Court fonnd hoth statute~
eonstitutional, the case is obviously distingnislrnhle frorn
the instant case in that the misdemeanor statute ma(k
usr of narcotics a crime and possession of a rnucotie
under the statute was prima farie <>Yifll'JlC(' of an int<·nl
to illegally use a narcotic. On tlw otli<>r l1and tlw i'<·lo11\·
statutf> madP possession of nareoti"s al01w a crirrn•. '1'1

1

'
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conrt found a reasonable basis for each statnte, and
distinguished Pirkey and Olsrn, in that one who was
l1:-:ing drugs was not so dangerons as one in possession,
wl10 could dispense to anotlwr.
F1Jon the anthorities cited, defendant contends that
the laws of rtah making possession of LSD a crime are
n11eonstitnticmal:J.1s; a denial of eqnal protection for the
rrasons herein:~tated, ·In making such allegation counsel
d(JPS not disregard provision (g) of 58-33-6 Utah Codn
Ann. (as rnacted 1967) which reads:
N othwithstanding the other provision of this
act, whenever the possE'ssion, sale, transfer, or
dispensing of any drug or substance would constitute an offense under this act and also constitntPs an offense under the laws of this state
re' la ting to the possession, sale, transfer or disp<'nsing of narcotic drugs or marijuana, such offrnse shall not be punishable nnder this act but
shall be punishabel under snch other provision of
law.
However, under the recent decision of State v. Rasmussen, ts Utah 2d 201, 418 P.2d 134 (1966) wherein the
eonrt held §77-1-8 (6) Utah Code Ann. (1953), which
~ta ted an incarcerated defendant " ... shall be entitled
ti) a trinl within thirtv daYs aft<>r arraignment ... ," to
hr• (lirrdonT and not mandatory, the language of provi:;ion ( µ:)
l'11r<\

of

58-::l~-(;

might likc>wise he directory. There-

a prosecutor could, at his whim, still determine to

')

I
\
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prosecute an offender as a folon or a misdemenant for
the single act of possession of LSD and the problem
of equal protection in Utah's law governing I_.jSD still
exists. State v. Pirkey, supra; See Stnte 1.:. Carman,
.q1pra.

Defendant, therefore, contends that the existence of
two statutes proscribing the same cohduct, to-wit: possession of LSD, yet prescribing different punishments is
violative of equal protection (Pirkey and Olsen, supra)
and, therefore, the laws are unconstitutional, in that tlw
laws of Utah as set out above grant to a prosecutor tl1!'
right to proceed against an accused for a misdenwanor
or a felony, all at the whim of the prosrcutor. Sncl1 a
situation is contrary to sonnd legal policy. Cf. State r.
Cnrnw11, supra. \Yherefore, defendant contends t1::1t tlw
matter should be dismissed, or in the alternative that tlli'
situation should be remedied in favor of the defendant.
ARGUMENT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S ALTERNATIVE REQUEST TO CONSTRUE THE OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF LSD
TO BE A MISDEMEANOR IN THAT THE LATEST
EXPRESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE RELATING
TO SUCH OFFENSE l\IADE THE SAl\lE A MISDEMEANOR AND SUCH LEGISLATIVE EXPRESSION REPEALED BY Il\IPLICATION THE FELONY
LAW RELATING TO POSSESSION OF LSD.
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1t is recognized that where two enactments of the

I( gislative hranch are plainly inconsistent and irrecon('ilahle tlw latest expression of the legislature takes prer1·dP11eP o\-er the former, [Thiokol Chemical Corporation
1. Pefl'rson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 393 P.2d 391 (1964)], and
tlw latter will, by implication, repeal the former. State
i'. Carman, 140 P. 670 (Utah 1914). Such a rule of law
i~ ('qually applicable in the situation where hvo acts,
(·nactPd at the same session of a legislature, are inconsisknt or repugnant to each other; in such a case the
net last in sequence of the opposing legislatiw Pnactuwnts is presumed to be the last in time and prevails
OYPI' that which is first in sequence. State v. 111 ontiel,
GG J\'".:M. 181, 241 P.2d 844 (1952). Although repeal by
implication is not favored, [Glenn v. Ferrell, 5 Utah 2d
4~9, 304 P .2d 380 (1956)], and especially when two stat11tes are passed at the same legislative session [In re
Lewis' Adoption, 380 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1963)], such repeal
is, nevertheless, necessary when the statutes cannot be
rrconciled. Thiokol Chcrnical Corporation v. Peterson,
s111Jra; State v. M ont£?il s11pra. Because possession of
was made a misdemeanor offense subsequent to its
lwing made a felony (See Laws of Utah 1967, Chapter
1+0 and 139 respectively), the latter law takes precedence
oVPr the former and is the controlling law in Ptah.
,cfate 1c. JJ!ontirl, s11prn.

um

Sf((f(' 1., Jlonticl, s11prn, reversed an indecent expo~111·p and indecPnt handling of a female minor conviction
rlf the' d<>l<'ndant on grounds that the legislature at the
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same session had fixed two distinct terms of court, and
defendant was tried in the term fixed bv the first art
"
'
which had been repealed by the second act. Due to tlw
enactment of the two acts on the same subject, and tlw
implied reepal of the former, the con rt held defendant
was tried in a term not authorized by law. In State v.
Carman supra, the Utah 8upr0me Conrt upheld a conviction of defendant for selling liq nor to an Indian; however, his felony conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor
in that the court found two statues to exist on tlw saiiw
snbject, to-wit: selling liquor to an Indian; and tlH
misdemeanor law being latter in time impliedly repeal<)d
the former f(,lonv statnh>. At 672 the ronrt stat<'d:
1

\\Te hav0 also repeat<'dl~- Jwld that, whilr re1wals hy implication are not fayorrd by the rrrnrts,
~-et, ,d1Pn' thP lafrr prm·isions upon a giv('Jl sitliject are clearly and manifestly repugnant to ('Xisting provisions, the later ones control, and, so far
as they are repugnant to the earlier provisiom;,
the earlier ones must be deemed to be repealed h>'
implication. . . . We think the case at bar clearly
falls wW1in the doctrin<~ there announced.
Because the provisions of !'58-13a-2 and 58-33-2, under
their respective acts, both make possession of LSD a
criminal offense, but punishable by separatee penaltirs,
the two are repugnant and inconsistent. State v. Carmall,
supra. According to Laws of Ftah 19()7, LSD was tennt>cl
a narcotic drng by Chapt0r 139 and was pm;sed hy tlw
legislature }\larch 2, 19G7. On the other haHd h~- Chapter
140, LRD was declared to hP a "dPpressa11t or stirnnlniil
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drng" on March 9, 19G7; however, each act became effectin' May 9, 19G7. Therefore, follffwing the statutory con;;irnction rule of Monteil, s11prn and Cannan, supra,
C'!iaptt>r 33 of Title 58, Ftah Code Ann. insofar as it
relates to the offense of possession of LSD, being the
the last expression of the lc>gislatnre, impliedly repeals
those provisions of Chapter 13a of rritle 58 Utah Code
,\nn., insofar as they relate to the identical suhjrct
matter. Consequently defendant in thf' instant casr
;.;]1onld he re-sentencPd und<•r ~58-33--i (a).
In drawing the above conclusion counsel is not unmindful of the fact that provision (g) of 58-33-6 asserts
that ·when possession of a drng would be an offense
m1der both the Drng Abuse Lm\T and under the Narcotic

,\ct, the act should be punishable under the narcotic laws
nf Utah. However, in construing statutes, whenever possihl<', tlw conrt should give f'ffect to eyery part of an
art, [Totorica v. Thomas, 1G Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 984
(1D5G)], including 0very word, clause and sentence of a
lPgislative enactment. Maw v. Lee, 157 P.2d 585 (Utah
1~45). In order to give rff ect to every provision of the
1%7 Utah Drug Abuse La-w, thf' court mnst declare posS<•ssion of LSD nnder 58-33-2(c) to he a misdemeanor by
i"JK<t3-4(a) of that act. Hmn•ver, 58-33-G(g), if followPd,
J (•ndt>rs t1H' portions of the Drng Abuse Law relating
!rJ posst>ssion of LSD ·withont effect; yet the Drng Abuse
1.nw with rrspPct to LRD is tlH.' last expression of the
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Jegislature and should be controlling over the Narcotic
Law, if such provisions of the Drug Ahnse Law relating
to LSD are to have effect.
Because the Drug Abuse Act is the latter enactment
of the legislature as opposed to the LSD provision under
the narcotic act, the court belffw, in passing s0ntence upon
the defendant, should have imposed sentence under ~5833-4( a) Utah Code Ann. (as ("nacted 19G7) rather than
nndrr ~58-13a-44 Utah Code Ann. (as enact0d 1%7).
State v. Carnurn, supra.
ARGUMENT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REDUCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
TO A MISDEMEANOR VIOLATION IN THAT THE
CONFLICT WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR OFFENSES OF POSSESSION

OF LSD

SHOULD

HAVE

BEEN RE-

SOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE LEAST HARSH PENALTY UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF LENITY.

Undt•r the rnle of lenity ·where a criminal statute
lends itself to more than one interpretation and neithrr
the statute nor its legislative history lend itself to a dPfinite meaning, a construction adopting tltC> less lwr:-;h
application to the accused is favored. f,((i/ller 10. l'J1if,·J
States, 358 U.S. 1G9 (1958): Prince 1·. U11if!'d States, :l;l~
U.R. ~22 (1957): Rell v. United 8tofr'.c;, ;~+0 P.f~. ~~1 (1q;):il
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Tltr rule of lenity has been applied to merge separate
offensPs into a single crime, (Bell v. United States,
_,11;1rn), or cause an act injuring two victims to be but a
:'inp,'le offense. Ladner v. United States, supra. It is contuncle<l that lenity should equally apply to the instant
situation, where two statutes express separate punishnwnt for the same offense, and the less harsh punishment
f:l1onlcl lle adopted favorahlP to the defendant.

In the Lad11rr casr, su1;ra, thP Supreme Court of thr
['11it<>d Stat(_•s considered the qnestion whether the firing
of a single shot, ·which injured two federal officers, cont'iitnted a single assault offense or separate offenses for
11·hich separate sentences could be imposed. In reversing
111(• affirmative answer of the intermediate appellate
eomt thP Rnprt>me Court applied the doctrine of lenity,
11la('ing the less harsh construction on the assault statute
in qut•stion, ruling that hnt one offense -vrns committed;
how<>ver, the matter was remanded to detrrmine whether
d(•fenclant had fired more than one shot. To support
its position the United States Supreme Court asserted
tliat lenity should be applied to adopt a less harsh interJ1rPtation of a statute where Congress had failed to give
a definit<~ meaning or a statute is subject to ambiguity.
At 178 thr court stated:
'l'his polir\· of lenit:· means that the Court
will 11ot inteqn·<>t a foclc>ral niminal statute so as
to iner<'rn~(' the JH'nalt~· that it plaC'es on an indi\'i<hrnl wl1<'11 snrl1 nn interpretation ean he based
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on no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended.
In Prince, sitprn, lenity was applied to merge tlw
offense of entering a bank with intent to rob into tlw
offense of robbery, thus allowing but a single offense.
Rell, supra, applied the rnle to the transportation of
two women on the same trip in violation of the statute
n•lating to transportation for prostitution purposes and
fonnd but a single offense. In Harris v. Unit<'d 8tatrs,
;~59 U.S. 19, r<'h den., 359 U.S. mG (1959) the court n·fnsed to apply the doctrine of lenity to the offenses of '
imrchasing heroine from an unstamped package and receiving and concealing the same knffwing it to have 1wrn
1mlawfully imported. Petitioner argued that 1wcaus(' ~i
single act of possession raised presmnptions for ho~]i
crimes, consecutive s~'ntences, which had been impoc~l'd
upon him, were improper. However, the conrt recognizl'(l
that because Congress, by numerous narcotic statute;;,
evidenced an intent to deal more severely -Yvith the narcotic problem, a policy of severity rather than lenity was
adopted. Nevertheless, the court also explained that tlw ,
two offenses were distinctly different as to proof.
In the instant case the Utah statutes relating to
possession of LSD cover the precise same elements ~-ct
provide separate punishrrn'nts. Th0 legislature, Pxcept
as stated in provision (g) of 53_;3;~-Ci, ha~; evidenr<>d :t
trend toward lenity in the> pos~wssion of LSD in il1;1i
snch possession ,,-as madt• a misdt>mc·nnor ~'.nh:c:ciq1wnt 1•·
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]wing made a felony. Furthrr, because the Drng
,\ h11sr' Law was encated after possrssion of LSD ·was
i:1nde a frlony (see Argnm0nt II, supra) at best an
e1:11higuity arises as to what the Utah Legislature really
i11h·nded to do with LSD. Therefore, under the doctrine
of lenity as announced by the Snpreme Court of the
Unitrd Stat0s in Lander, suprn, the indefiniteness and
alllhignit,\' caused by the Utah Legislature under the hrn
,,tPatntes in question should be resofred in favor of the
dPfrmlant - the sentence should be made a misdemeanor
as rrrp1irrd by ~58-33-4 (a) 1Ttah Code Ann. (as enact0rl
it~

1~G7).

CONCLUSTON

For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully contended
that the matter against defendant should he quashed, or
al1emati\'ely reduced to comply with ~5S-33-4(a) Utah
f1rlrk• Ann. (as en ca ted 19G7).
Respectfully submitted,
.TAY V. BARNEY

Attorney for Appellant

